艾奇沃思模型的解釋只描述了兩個賣家的市場不穩定。哈羅德·霍特林在1929年對這種觀點提出了質疑他認為:價格或產出不穩定不是寡頭壟斷的一個基本特征。經濟學在研究市場結構對資源配置效率的影響時，根據市場的不同，每一個企業都會影響其產品的價格，將市場分為完全競爭市場和不完全競爭市場、壟斷市場。網絡經濟對傳統經濟中的壟斷和競爭概念賦予了新的意義。在網絡經濟中，競爭將導致壟斷的出現。壟斷的出現不能消除競爭狀態。在網絡經濟中，產品的高固定成本、低邊際成本、正反饋機制、高轉移成本和“鎖定”效應成為壟斷因素。同時，網絡經濟中的壟斷狀況也不穩定。創新也是網絡經濟的特點。因此，競爭無處不在并加劇。網絡經濟趨向于壟斷市場的主要原因有：網絡產品的內在特性。其特點包括：網絡產品的規模經濟性、網絡產品的外部性、網絡產品的鎖定效應和網絡產品的標準化、網絡產品的版權保護以及網絡經濟中的并購。在過去的幾十年中，空間模型一直受到經濟學家的關注。電視廣播時間或公共汽車/飛機時刻表提供了一個UHM的例子。在時間表游戲中，如上例所示，相對于理想時間，消費者可能更愿意等待一段時間，而不是提前到達以獲得服務。從以上分析可以看出，產品差異化會降低市場需求的價格彈性。在相同的質量條件下，同類產品之間的差異越大，市場需求的價格彈性越小，企業調整價格的空間越大。企業所采取的產品價格策略實際上是一種市場壁壘形式，從而獲得競爭策略。為了同時滿足差異化消費者的需求，發揮一套防范競爭對手或潛在競爭對手的障礙。另一方面，產品差異化會削弱價格競爭的強度。同類產品差異化程度越高，如產品銷售區域定位價值差異越大，買方對產品的主觀偏好程度越高，此時買方承擔的流動成本越大，而市場價格對消費者需求的影響越小。呃。因此，企業降價吸引消費者的意義不大。在以上的霍特林線細分模型中，我們要對產品的銷售區域和品牌進行差異化的討論。除上述兩個區別特征外，產品還具有產品質量、產品外觀、包裝、市場形象、兼容性等諸多區別特征。將這些特征引入到熱橢圓線段模型中進行分析，可以得到相同的結論。The explanations of the Edgeworth model describe the instability in the market for only two sellers. Harold Hotelling challenged this view in 1929; he argued that price or output instability was not an essential feature of an oligopoly. Economics in the study of market structure on the efficiency of resource allocation, according to the market each enterprise can affect the price of their products, the market is divided into a fully competitive market and imperfect competitive market, monopoly market. The network economy has given new meaning to the concept of monopoly and competition in the traditional economy. In the network economy, competition will lead to the emergence of monopoly. The emergence of monopoly cannot eliminate the state of competition. In the network economy, the characteristics of high fixed cost, low marginal cost, positive feedback mechanism, high transfer cost and "lock" effect of the products become the factors of monopoly. At the same time, the monopoly situation in the network economy is unstable. Innovation is also the characteristics of the network economy. As a result, competition is ubiquitous and intensified. The network economy tends to monopolize the market mainly in the following reasons: the inherent characteristics of network products. Its characteristics include: the economies of scale of network products, the externalities of network products, the locking effect of network products and the standardization of network products, copyright protection of network products and mergers and acquisitions in the network economy. The spatial model has received sustained attention from economists over the past few decades.An example of UHM is provided by a television broadcast time or a bus / air schedule. In a timetable game, as in the example above, consumers may be more likely to wait for a period of time relative to the ideal time, rather than earlier arriving to get the service. From the above analysis, we can see that product differentiation will reduce the price elasticity of market demand. Under the same quality conditions, the greater the difference between similar products, the smaller the price elasticity of market demand, the greater the room for enterprises to adjust the price. The product price strategy taken by enterprises is actually a form of market barriers, so as to obtain competitive strategy. To meet the needs of differentiated consumers at the same time, play a set to prevent competitors or potential competitors obstacles. On the other hand, product differentiation will weaken the intensity of price competition. The higher the degree of differentiation of similar products, such as product sales area positioning value of the difference between the greater, the buyer of the product the higher the degree of subjective preferences, at this point the buyer to bear the greater the cost of mobility, while the impact of market prices on consumer demand, the smaller. Therefore, enterprises reduce the price to attract consumers to the less meaningful. In the above Hotelling line segment model, we are to product sales area and brand to discuss the problem of differentiation. In addition to the above two differentiated features, the product also has product quality, product appearance, packaging, market image, compatibility and many other differentiated features. The same conclusion can be obtained if these features are incorporated into the Hotelling line segment model for analysis.
Suppose a linear market with length 1. Consumers in the market evenly distributed. Let x∈ [0,1] denote the location of each consumer. There are two companies, Company A and Company B, whose locations are identified by a and b, respectively. Let us use A to denote the firms in the equilibrium on the left and B the firms on the right. I leave the traditional two-way Hotelling model, assuming that each company can only sell to its left in the consumer. Each firm is produced at a fixed marginal cost, normalized to zero. The fixed cost is zero, but the firm pays the transportation costs and moves the goods from the factory to the consumer(Eaton &Tweedle, 2012). It is reasonable to hypothesis costs and others of linear transportation. That is to say, in order to deliver one unit of product from plant a (accordingly b) to consumer x, company A (or B) pays the transportation cost equal to: t | ax | (corresponding t | bx |. Where t is the (strictly positive) unit transportation cost. The company sets the price for a particular location in the Bertrand game, and sets the number of specific places in the Cournot game. Thus, the inverse demand function is: px = 1 - Qx, where Qx is the total amount provided by the firm at position x Qx ≡ q A(.) + q B(.)). I assume that t ≤ 12: This condition guarantees that there is no local monopoly in the area where both firms can serve, and that none of the locations have a positive amount in the equilibrium. This hypothesis is the standard in the literature on space price discrimination.
In a two-stage game where there is a balance of positions where the company simultaneously selects where to locate, the second stage also selects the price table 4. In this section and below, the sub-game Nash equilibrium concept is used to solve the game (Biscaia&Mota, 2013).
Note that firm A’s equilibrium location depends on the transportation costs. In fact:
In this section, I study the position balance that occurs in a two-stage game in which the company simultaneously selects where to locate and at the same time selects the quantity schedule in the second phase (Tabuchi, 2012). The reason for this difference is as follows. In the Bertrand equilibrium, only Company A serves the consumer on the left, and in Cournot equilibrium, both firms serve consumers on the left side of Company A. Therefore, the strategic effect is not so strong because the rightward movement of firm A is not fully reflected in the reduced markup 12.
Connaught model is by the French economist Anthony Augustine Cournot in 1838 put forward. Is the earliest version of the Nash equilibrium application, the Cournot model is often used as the starting point for oligarchical analysis. The Cournot model is a simple model with only two oligarchs, which is also called a "duopoly model." The model illustrates how the output decisions of firms competing with each other without co-ordination interact with each other to produce a result that lies between competitive equilibrium and monopoly equilibrium. The conclusion of the Cournot model can be easily extended to the case of three or more oligopoly firms.
The Cournot model assumes that there is only two sellers in a product market, and that there is no collusion between them, but how each other knows how each other will act to determine the optimal yield to maximize profit, The model is also called the double headed monopoly theory. The Cournot model analyzes the case of two oligarchs selling zero-cost-of-production for the same product. The Cournot model assumes that only the A and B firms in the market produce and sell the same products and that their production costs are zero; that their common market demand curves are linear and that both firms A and B are accurate To understand the market demand curve; A, B two manufacturers are known to each other in the case of production, each to determine their own to maximize the profits of production, that is, each manufacturer is a negative to their own production to adapt The other has been determined the yield. The above two-headed Cournot model can be generalized. Let the number of oligopolies be m, then the general conclusion can be drawn as follows: The equilibrium output of each oligopoly firm = total market capacity / (m + 1). The industry's total equilibrium output = total market capacity, m / (m + 1). The drawback of the Cournot model is the assumption that the firm does not change the output of its competitors. Bertrand duopoly Model (Bertrand duopoly Model) by the French economist Joseph Bertrand (Joseph Bertrand) was established in 1883. Cournot model and Starkelberg model are the production of the manufacturers as a means of competition is a yield competition model, and Bertrand model is the price competition model. The Bertrand model assumes that when firms formulate their prices, it is assumed that the prices of other firms will not change because of their decisions, and n (for simplicity, n = 2) the products of oligopoly firms are complete substitutes. A, B two companies were the price of P1, P2, marginal cost is equal to C. According to the assumption of the model, A, B, two companies have strong substitutes between the products (completely replaceable, that is, the price is different, the higher prices will be completely sold out), so the consumer choice is the price Low enterprise products; if A, B prices are equal, then the two companies split demand. Therefore, the two companies will compete to cut prices in order to win more customers. When the price down to P1 = P2 = MC, to achieve equilibrium, that Bertrand equilibrium.As long as a competitor exists, the behavior of the firm is the same as in the perfectly competitive market structure, and the price is equal to the marginal cost. According to the Bertrand model, the low price will win the whole market, and the high price will lose the whole market, so the oligarchs will cut each other until the price equals their marginal cost. |